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ABSTRACT 
The feminist critique of pornography focuses on the evils that 
pornography brings about. That critique is also animated by a positive 
ideal of sexuality. I examine this positive ideal as developed by Rae 
Langton, who has recently offered a sustained philosophical account of 
the feminist critique. Langton’s ideal is a fundamentally defective and self-
defeating aspiration, likely to thwart rather than to facilitate the 
interpersonal communion she values. It paradoxically reproduces the 
solipsism it denounces. The defects of her ideal strengthen the case for 
other, more pornography-friendly forms of feminism.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The feminist critique of pornography, commonly offered as a 
justification for its restriction by the law, relies on pornography’s sexual 
objectification of women, eroticization of female submissiveness, and 
trivialization of women’s own needs and desires. That critique is also 
animated by a positive ideal of sexuality. This Article examines that 
positive ideal. 
Aspirations matter, and they matter for law when the coercive 
apparatus of the state is placed behind them. Obscenity is one area where 
the Supreme Court has made its aspirations explicit. When it announced 
the still-operative test for determining when obscenity is not protected by 
the First Amendment,
1
 the Court explained that a central reason for 
obscenity’s non-protection is that “a sensitive, key relationship of human 
existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development 
of human personality, can be debased and distorted by crass commercial 
exploitation of sex.”2  
 
 
 1. The present test for determining whether a publication is obscene, laid down in Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), is 
(a) whether the “average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts 
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 2. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973). Paris and Miller were decided on the 
same day. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/1
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Many scholars wonder what harm could possibly be caused by 
obscenity.
3
 Material can be obscene even if it has no likelihood of inciting 
anyone to unlawful conduct, and even if no unwilling viewer is ever likely 
to see and thereby be offended by it. Obscenity law aims to prevent the 
formation of certain thoughts—typically erotic ones—in the minds of 
willing viewers.
4
 The earliest and most influential definition of obscenity 
is the English case Regina v. Hicklin, which holds that a publication is 
obscene if it has a “tendency . . . to deprave and corrupt those whose 
minds are open to such immoral influences.”5 The modern Supreme Court 
follows this approach, with modifications.
6
 Obscenity doctrine aims to 
prevent moral harm.
7
 
Harry Clor notes that “notions of what is harmful to human beings are 
ultimately linked to ideas of what is good for us,”8 and, on this basis, he 
persuasively argues that the question of pornography’s harmfulness 
depends on our understanding of what makes humans flourish. To harm 
someone is in some way to set back his interests. Ideas of harm are thus 
necessarily linked to aspirations: if I do something to you that obstructs 
your path to something that is worth having, then I have harmed you. The 
Paris Court ruled that obscenity can harm people by debasing and 
degrading “a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to 
family life, community welfare, and the development of human 
personality.”9 The Court thinks its ideal of sexual relationships can be 
thwarted by free dissemination of obscenity. For that reason, it is willing 
to carve out an exception to normal free speech protection, so that the state 
can protect us with censorship. That aspiration is evidently more important 
than free speech. Unless the aspiration is understood, the law is 
incomprehensible. Perhaps that is why so many critics of the law have 
failed to comprehend it. 
The moral vision of Chief Justice Warren Burger is shared by a 
diminishing portion of the legal community. The language of Paris seems 
quaint now. But the idea that obscenity can harm us by impeding our path 
 
 
 3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 351–82 (1992); Louis Henkin, Morals and 
the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963).  
 4. This was noted long ago by Louis Henkin, who however was entirely baffled by the notion of 
harm that concerned the Court. See Henkin, supra note 3. 
 5. L.R.-Q.B. 360, 371 (1868). 
 6. See JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS 171–78 (1985). 
 7. I elaborate this argument in Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1635 (2005). 
 8. HARRY M. CLOR, PUBLIC MORALITY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY 115 (1996). 
 9. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 63. 
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toward an ideal of sexual reciprocity has lately been given a spirited new 
articulation in a feminist mode. Confrontation with the best philosophical 
case for the suppression of pornography is indispensable in order to decide 
whether the law today draws the line in an appropriate place. If that case is 
unsustainable, then so is the argument for the legal status quo. This is a 
situation in which philosophy has manifest practical entailments. 
Rae Langton, professor of philosophy at Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, presents the most sophisticated, sustained philosophical 
account of the feminist critique of pornography.
10
 She is justly renowned 
for her brilliant and devastating critique of Ronald Dworkin’s work in this 
area.  
In this Article, I propose to examine her positive aspiration of 
sexuality. Langton’s ideal for obscenity law, I argue, is fundamentally 
defective and self-defeating, likely to thwart rather than to facilitate the 
interpersonal communion she values. It paradoxically reproduces the 
solipsism it denounces. The defects of her ideal strengthen the case for 
other, more pornography-friendly forms of feminism.  
I. THE PATH INTO SOLIPSISM 
A. The Feminism of Fear 
To eliminate the negative, you’ve got to accentuate the positive. Judith 
Shklar, in her well-known essay “The Liberalism of Fear,” argued that 
liberalism at its core is a negative rather than a positive ideal. Liberalism’s 
primary concern is tyrannical cruelty, and the fear that cruelty inspires. 
The rights that it demands are “just those licenses and empowerments that 
citizens must have in order to preserve their freedom and to protect 
themselves against abuse.”11 But even in Shklar’s account, the liberalism 
of fear is related to the liberalism of hope. “[T]he original and only 
defensible meaning of liberalism” is that “[e]very adult should be able to 
make as many effective decisions without fear or favor about as many 
aspects of her or his life as is compatible with the like freedom of every 
other adult.”12 Evidently, it is hard to describe the negative without saying 
something about what we hope for.  
 
 
 10. RAE LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PORNOGRAPHY AND 
OBJECTIFICATION (2009). 
 11. Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 37 (Nancy 
Rosenblum ed., 1989). 
 12. Id. at 21. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/1
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Like other feminist critics of pornography, Langton primarily focuses 
on pornography’s alleged harms. She focuses on the way in which it 
silences women, makes it difficult and sometimes impossible for them to 
protect themselves from violence and abuse and makes their needs and 
hurts invisible. She capably demonstrates that prominent defenders of a 
legal right to pornography have not adequately reckoned with these harms. 
Her critique of Ronald Dworkin, for example, is subtle, insightful, and 
devastating.
13
 Her claim that pornography objectifies or subordinates 
women does not logically depend on any particular account of the sexual 
ideal. But the feminism of fear is related to the feminism of hope, most 
clearly in the title essay in her collection Sexual Solipsism. 
The opposite of solipsism is a certain kind of interpersonal 
communion. That communion, Langton thinks, cannot coexist with 
solitary sexual fantasy, like that provided by pornography. Her deepest 
problem with pornography is that it offers a bad answer to the old Socratic 
question, how should one live? She cites Pamela Paul’s interview with one 
woman, who felt alone even during sex with her husband, who was 
evidently a heavy consumer of pornography: 
I obviously knew where his body was, but where was his mind? He 
would sort of be there at first, but then I didn’t know where he went. 
. . . At a certain point I realized I was just a tool. I could have been 
anything or anybody. I felt so lonely, even when he was in the 
room.
14
 
This loneliness has a counterpart in this statement of one male consumer 
of pornography: “I don’t see how any male who likes porn can think actual 
sex is better, at least if it involves all the crap that comes with having a 
real live female in your life.”15 Pornography is bad because it destroys 
human relationships. As Pamela Paul explains, “At first, an encounter with 
pornography is a way of imagining being with a woman. Later, an 
encounter with a woman becomes a way of imagining being with 
pornography.”16 These men’s fantasies, nurtured by pornography, become 
an obstacle to intimacy with actual women. 
 
 
 13. LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 65–74, 117–71. 
 14. Id. at 23 (quoting PAMELA PAUL, PORNIFIED: HOW PORNOGRAPHY IS DAMAGING OUR 
LIVES, OUR RELATIONSHIPS, AND OUR FAMILIES 232 (2005)). 
 15. Id. at 17 (quoting PAUL, supra note 14, at 39). 
 16. Id. at 23. Here as elsewhere, Langton is elaborating on an idea earlier developed by Catharine 
MacKinnon: 
Pornography participates in its audience’s eroticism because it creates an accessible sexual 
object, the possession and consumption of which is male sexuality, to be consumed and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Langton notes two pertinent definitions of pornography, and the 
controversial relationship between them. Catharine MacKinnon and 
Andrea Dworkin define it as “the graphic sexually explicit subordination 
of women in pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized as 
sexual objects, things, or commodities.”17 Melinda Vadas uses the term to 
refer to “‘any object that has been manufactured to satisfy sexual desire 
through its sexual consumption or other sexual use as a woman’ where 
‘as’ means ‘in the role, function, or capacity of’ a woman.”18 Langton 
thinks all sexually arousing material treats women as “servile, inferior, 
less-than-human.”19 In her view, the pornography as defined by Vadas 
may also be pornography as defined by MacKinnon.
20
 The hypothesis is 
that the use of pornography, any pornography, leads to both contempt for 
women described by MacKinnon and the solipsism described by Paul. 
B. A Fantasy of Rape 
How does Langton view sexual fantasy? There is not a single instance 
in her book in which Langton describes fantasy in a positive light, and she 
sometimes seems to sympathize with a view that condemns all sexual 
fantasy and aspires to eliminate it from human experience. Her sexual 
ideal appears to be a direct encounter with another person, unmediated by 
any thoughts of anything else. 
Sexual Solipsism includes sustained engagement with only one fantasy, 
that entertained by a character named Leonard in Ian McEwan’s novel, 
The Innocent.
21
 Leonard is a young Englishman in Berlin in 1955. He has 
his first sexual experience with a German woman, Maria, who is drawn to 
 
 
possessed as which is female sexuality. In this sense, sex in life is no less mediated than it is 
in art. Men have sex with their image of a woman. 
CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 199 (1989). 
 17. LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 4 (quoting CATHARINE MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 176 (1987)). 
 18. Id. at 315 (quoting Melinda Vadas, The Manufacture-for-use of Pornography and Women’s 
Inequality, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 174, 190 (2005)). Langton herself oscillates between the two definitions, 
sometimes clearly using “pornography” to refer only to material that endorses the degradation of 
women, see SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 39, 40, 92, 138, 190, 288, and sometimes referring 
to any material that is marketed as sexually arousing. See id. at 19–21. Sometimes she slides from one 
to the other, as if the MacKinnon definition could unproblematically be assumed to cover everything 
marketed as arousing. See id. at 25, 79, 105–07. Here she may be assuming what I call the modified 
Vadas claim, discussed below, that all male sexuality directed at objects, such as pornographic 
photographs, is morally illicit and tends to devalue women. 
 19. Id. at 307. 
 20. Id. at 346–55. 
 21. IAN MCEWAN, THE INNOCENT (1990). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/1
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him by his ingenuousness and kindness. After they have been together for 
some weeks, however, strange thoughts start to form in Leonard’s mind: 
He looked down at Maria, whose eyes were closed, and 
remembered she was a German. The word had not been entirely 
prised loose of its associations after all. . . . German. Enemy. Mortal 
enemy. Defeated enemy. This last brought with it a shocking thrill. 
He diverted himself momentarily . . . Then: she was the defeated, 
she was his by right, by conquest, by right of unimaginable violence 
and heroism and sacrifice.
22
 
Leonard’s fantasy becomes more elaborate, leading to what Langton 
regards as two distinct catastrophes. Leonard is at first embarrassed, but 
his embarrassment does not last. 
He accepted the obvious truth that what happened in his head could 
not be sensed by Maria, even though she was only inches away. 
These thoughts were his alone, nothing to do with her at all.
23
 
The sexual encounter, Langton observes, has now become “intensely 
solipsistic.”24 By imagining her as dominated, Leonard is treating her as if 
she were a thing, “the thoughts that are irresistibly exciting are thoughts in 
which she features as something that is conquered, possessed, owned by 
right, captured against her will, violated against her will.”25 But there is 
also solipsism in the “deliberate deception.”26  
Sex has ceased to be something he is doing with her, in the sense 
that one does something with another human being, shares an 
activity. It has become something he is doing with her, in the sense 
that one does something with a thing, uses an instrument. The scene 
has a more than epistemological claustrophobia: it is a solipsism of 
treating a person as a thing.
27
 
The first catastrophe, then, is the coming-into-being of this fantasy, which 
drives a wedge into the intimacy between Leonard and Maria. 
 
 
 22. Id. at 78. Langton quotes this passage twice in Sexual Solipsism at 253 and again at 342. 
 23. LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 343 (quoting MCEWAN, supra note 21, at 
79). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 344. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Leonard shares Langton’s dissatisfaction with this state of affairs. He is 
not contented with “using Maria as a screen for his private theatre.”28 His 
solution to this problem produces the second catastrophe. Here is the next 
passage Langton discusses. I have added the numbers. 
[1] He found himself tempted to communicate these imaginings to 
her . . . he wanted her to acknowledge what was on his mind, 
however stupid it really was. [2] He could not believe she would not 
be aroused by it. . . . [3] He wanted his power recognized and Maria 
to suffer from it, just a bit, in the most pleasurable way. . . . 
[4] Then he was ashamed. What was this power he wanted 
recognized? It was no more than a disgusting story in his head. 
[5] Then later, he wondered whether she might not be excited by it 
too. [6] There was, of course, nothing to discuss. There was nothing 
he was able, or dared, to put into words. He could hardly be asking 
her permission. [7] He had to surprise her, show her, let pleasure 
overcome her rational objections. He thought all this, and knew it 
was bound to happen.
29
 
Langton observes that readers “wait with dread for the (inevitable?) 
disaster that ensues when Leonard—already confusing fact with fiction in 
his demand that his actual power be recognized, and that Maria actually 
suffer—tries to communicate his imaginings through actions, rather than 
words.”30 What follows “is something both parties view, or come to view, 
as attempted rape.”31 
What should Leonard have done? Consider his train of thought. 
Thought [1] is the opposite of solipsism: he wants to close the gap 
between their minds, to tell Maria what he is imagining. What can he hope 
will happen if he does that? At a minimum, he will no longer be deceiving 
her, though he still may be using her as a screen for his fantasies. His best-
case scenario is [2] and [5]: perhaps she will be aroused by the same 
fantasy. 
But of course he knows that things might not work out that way. She 
might find his fantasies repulsive. She might feel that the shame expressed 
in [4] is entirely appropriate. She has experienced violent soldiers and an 
abusive husband. Part of what drew her to Leonard was his gentleness and 
vulnerability, which made her feel that he was not at all like those men. 
 
 
 28. Id. at 345. 
 29. Id. at 353. 
 30. Id. at 345–46. 
 31. Id. at 254. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/1
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She might find it unbearable to be intimate with a man who she knows is 
thinking such thoughts. She might even leave him.  
Perhaps, because he does not want to contemplate that possibility, he 
slides into the fantasy of [3]. And it is at the point of [3] that Leonard’s 
imaginings really go off the rails, and take him to the disastrous delusion 
of [7]. 
Moves [2], [3], and [7] are examples of what Langton calls “blurring,” 
in which a fiction, specifically a fiction about women’s yearning for 
subordination, purports to be fact and is taken to be such.
32
 Move [2] is 
also “pseudo-empathy,” which is “an over-hasty disposition to attribute 
features of one’s own mind to other people, animals, or even inanimate 
objects.”33 
The deepest puzzle has to do with [1]. Leonard wants to communicate 
what is in his mind. But what follows from that? If he were to tell Maria 
about his fantasy, instead of foolishly trying to perform it without 
explanation, how ought she to react? Langton does not say. 
Nor is it clear what Langton thinks about Leonard’s hopes in [5], which 
as articulated acknowledges, as [2] does not, that he really does not know 
how Maria will react. Suppose that she does happen to find his fantasy 
arousing. Does that legitimate the sadomasochistic sex play that would 
follow? Or would that be a pair of complementary solipsisms, in which 
each of them uses the other as a screen on which to project ultimately 
private fantasies? 
Langton does not believe that Leonard’s fantasy could ever deliver the 
mutuality he hopes for. “Leonard’s is a desire to imagine raping; the one 
he projects onto Maria is a desire to imagine being raped. ‘He could not 
believe that she would not be aroused by it’; but the ‘it’ for her is hardly 
the same as the ‘it’ for him.”34 
C. Beings That Are Not Necessarily Persons 
Langton cites Melinda Vadas’s claim that where pornography is 
manufactured for use, “men’s sexual relations with women are 
conceptually unrelated to their female partner’s personhood,” and “it 
follows that men’s sexual relations with women will, under these 
conditions, be conceptually unrelated to any and all person-related 
 
 
 32. Id. at 190. 
 33. Id. at 247. It is also an instance of wishful thinking, the meaning of which is familiar. Id. 
 34. Id. at 254. 
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characteristics or abilities their female partners might have.”35 In 
pornography, Langton observes (here paraphrasing and in important ways 
reformulating Vadas), things are treated as if they were persons, and this 
“has implications for the status of real human beings. The harm to flesh-
and-blood women is that they are now members of a class of beings that 
are not necessarily persons.”36 Call this the modified Vadas claim. (The 
formulation is Langton’s, but she is tentative and exploratory, and does not 
unambiguously endorse it. As I note below, however, some of her other 
arguments evidently depend on something like this claim being true.) It is 
troubling if the phenomenon it describes leads to the mistreatment of 
women, but also “there can be misgivings about pornography’s animation 
of the inanimate that are not exactly feminist misgivings.”37 The consumer 
of pornography is shut up in himself, and this is bad in itself.
38
 Leonard’s 
first catastrophe happens, in a way, to everyone who uses pornography. 
Langton’s own sexual ideal evidently is the interpersonal communion 
vividly envisioned in the Song of Solomon, which, as she admiringly 
writes, describes “[t]he captive heart, the driving hunger for which 
ordinary hunger and thirst provide faint metaphors, the delight in the 
body.”39 It is the opposite of the solipsistic separation described by Pamela 
Paul, in which the man uses the woman merely as a substitute for 
pornography. In ideal sex, persons are treated precisely as persons. 
Part of what draws Maria to Leonard in the first place is the discovery 
that he has never been with another woman. As Langton summarizes, 
Maria finds endearing Leonard’s “ignorance about tactics and 
conventions,” which signifies that “there is room for discovery” in their 
relationship: “There is room for ordinary friendship: she has a chance to 
like him. There is room for desire: a chance for her to have desires which 
are not simply reactions to his. The two of them are free to be lovers who 
are partners in invention, which is what they indeed become.”40 Maria’s 
 
 
 35. Id. at 352 (quoting Vadas, supra note 18, at 190). 
 36. Id. (quoting Vadas, supra note 18). This paraphrase of Vadas is in part a sympathetic 
reconstruction of her argument, skillfully fashioned to avoid difficulties of the kind noted in Jennifer 
M. Saul, On Treating Things as People: Objectification, Pornography, and the History of the Vibrator, 
21 HYPATIA 45 (2006), though it was written before Saul’s article appeared. (SEXUAL SOLIPSISM is 
largely a collection of previously published work; this passage originally appeared in 1995.) Compare 
Vadas’s own formulation, quoted supra text accompanying note 18, which presupposes that producing 
male sexual satisfaction is the function of a woman. 
 37. LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 355. 
 38. See also id. at 250 (arguing that the selling of “a sexual tool for easy satisfaction of appetite, 
for ownership” commodifies men’s desire and women’s sexuality). 
 39. Id. at 364. 
 40. Id. at 324. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/1
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assessment is mainly accurate; Leonard is nothing at all like her brutal ex-
husband. But if she imagines that culture and convention will not 
contaminate him, then she is in the grip of fantasy herself. 
If all sexuality that is not directed entirely at a specific person is illicit, 
and contaminates even mutual sex that the same actor performs at another 
time, then we have returned to the old view that all masturbation is illicit.
41
 
The structure of the modified Vadas claim is oddly similar to that made by 
“new natural law” theorists Germain Grisez and John Finnis, who argue 
that only uncontracepted heterosexual sex by married couples is morally 
permissible. 
Choosing non-marital sex, Grisez argues, “damages the body’s 
capacity for the marital act as an act of self-giving which constitutes a 
communion of bodily persons.”42 This damage, Finnis explains, is “a 
damage to the person as an integrated, acting being; it consists principally 
in that disposition of the will which is initiated by the choice to engage in” 
such sexual activity.
43
 Consider a married man who has never committed 
adultery, but who might be willing to do so if, say, his wife were 
unavailable when he felt strong sexual desire. The exclusivity of the man’s 
sex with his wife is not an expression of commitment, because conditional 
willingness to commit adultery precludes commitment. He is thus 
motivated even in marital intercourse by something other than the good of 
marriage. This is why Finnis claims that the “complete exclusion of non-
marital sex acts from the range of acceptable and valuable human options 
is existentially, if not logically, a precondition for the truly marital 
character of one’s intercourse as and with a spouse.”44 When one damages 
that precondition, one damages marriage, because, as Grisez argues, “to 
 
 
 41. Similarly, Alison Assiter argues that pornographic fantasies, precisely because they involve 
fantasized objects that are not autonomous, reinforce men’s desires for women who are not 
autonomous. Alison Assister, Autonomy and Pornography, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN PHILOSOPHY 
58–71 (Morwenna Griffiths & Margaret Whitford eds., 1988). This is essentially the modified Vadas 
claim. If an object’s lack of autonomy constitutes bad sexuality, then it is hard to see how any sexual 
fantasy can escape condemnation. No object of sexual fantasy can be autonomous. One might still 
distinguish between a fantasy about a person qua person—say, my imagination of my monogamous 
partner who happens to be out of town for two weeks—and a fantasy about a person qua object. 
Perhaps only the latter, in which the object is an entirely self-contained illusion, is morally 
problematic. (Thanks to Anne Eaton for pointing to this distinction.) But this distinction is only a 
matter of degree. When my partner is not immediately present to confirm or disconfirm my 
imagination of what arouses her, then the object in my head is, to some extent, fantasy and not reality. 
 42. GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS, VOL. 2: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 650 
(1993). 
 43. John M. Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some 
Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 97, 119 (1997). 
 44. Id. at 123. 
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damage an intrinsic and necessary condition for attaining a good is to 
damage that good itself.”45 
On this basis, Grisez and Finnis produce a sexual ethic far more 
restrictive than any that Langton would endorse, condemning (among 
many other things) not only masturbation, but also homosexual sex and 
any marital sex involving male ejaculation outside the vagina. Langton 
fundamentally disagrees with the new natural law theorists. She ridicules 
Roger Scruton for declaring homosexuality and masturbation 
perversions,
46
 and likewise rejects Kant’s idea that there is something 
wrong with masturbation.
47
 But the modified Vadas claim nonetheless has 
this isomorphism with the Grisez-Finnis argument: both assert that 
directing sexuality at anything other than one’s partner compromises the 
sexual ideal. 
Scruton is less severe than this. He does not exactly condemn 
masturbation, but distinguishes two forms: “one, in which it relieves a 
period of sexual isolation, and is guided by a fantasy of copulation; the 
other, in which masturbation replaces the human encounter, and perhaps 
makes it impossible, by reinforcing the human terror, and simplifying the 
process, of sexual gratification.”48 He directs his ire at the second.49 Like 
Langton, he is concerned about the individual withdrawing into himself, 
using masturbation as a substitute for the human encounter. 
That concern has a long history. The moral panic over masturbation 
began in the early 1700s. Previously regarded as a minor sin, it was 
suddenly deemed a great physical and moral danger to youth, leading to 
lassitude, weakness, crime, insanity, and early death. Some parents 
permitted their sons to visit prostitutes as a means of preventing it.
50
 
Thomas Laqueur’s definitive study of the panic concludes that it coincided 
with the emergence of a profoundly individualist culture, in which the 
individual was newly freed to pursue his own conception of good, rather 
 
 
 45. GRISEZ, supra note 42, at 650–51. 
 46. LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 339. 
 47. Id. at 346–47. 
 48. ROGER SCRUTON, SEXUAL DESIRE: A MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE EROTIC 317 (1st ed. 
1986). 
 49. He does, however, think that any self-stimulation must be private and unobserved or it 
becomes obscene. Hence his insistence, the weirdness of which does not escape Langton, that a 
woman must not touch her clitoris during coition. Id. at 319. See also Martha Nussbaum, Sex in the 
Head, 33 N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS 49–52 (Dec. 18, 1986) (reviewing SEXUAL DESIRE by Roger Scruton). 
 50. See THOMAS W. LAQUEUR, SOLITARY SEX: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF MASTURBATION 373 
(2003); see also WALTER KENDRICK, THE SECRET MUSEUM: PORNOGRAPHY IN MODERN CULTURE 
138–43 (1988); HELEN LEFKOWITZ HOROWITZ, REREADING SEX: BATTLES OVER SEXUAL 
KNOWLEDGE AND SUPPRESSION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 92–93, 97–107, 394–403 (2003). 
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than to occupy his place within a providential order that lay beyond 
himself. This new autonomy generated the fear that the individual would 
withdraw entirely from society, pursuing pleasures that were asocial and 
autarkic.
51
 The fundamental fear was of the “solipsistic rejection of public 
life.”52 Its traces can still be seen in Langton, Vadas, and Scruton. It is, for 
the most part, a delusion.
53
 
II. THE PATH OUT OF SOLIPSISM 
A. The Uses of Fantasy 
Is there anything of value in Leonard’s sadomasochistic yearnings? 
Sexual fantasies, Michael Bader argues, should be understood as 
manifestations of the mind attempting creatively to construct a scenario in 
which pleasure can safely be pursued. Bader, who is a psychotherapist, 
describes a patient (he calls her Jan) who was unable to have an orgasm 
with her husband unless she fantasized that a large, strange man was 
holding her down and forcing sex on her. Jan, who was an outspoken 
feminist, was bewildered and embarrassed by her fantasy, which involved 
just the kind of man whom she loathed in real life. The fantasy was 
eventually explained in this way. Jan unconsciously believed that men 
were fragile and unable to stand up for themselves. She feared that, if she 
fully expressed her own sexuality, most men would feel threatened and 
overwhelmed. And she felt guilty about hurting them. The fantasy 
 
 
 51. LAQUEUR, supra note 50, at 210 & 249. 
 52. Id. at 268. 
 53. Pamela Paul’s book PORNIFIED, supra note 14, which Langton cites five times and praises as 
“excellent and accessible,” see SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 20, does provide anecdotal 
evidence that the feared withdrawal into autarky does sometimes happen. Paul recounts many stories 
of men who spend way too much time looking at pornography on their computers. PAUL, supra note 
18. But she never reveals how her interview subjects, 80 men and 20 women, were chosen. At least 
three of the couples she interviewed were in therapy, see id. at 139, 147, 170, and in an interview 
promoting her book, she reports that of those she spoke with, there were “probably two-dozen people 
who were addicted to pornography.” Interview, How Porn Destroys Lives, Beliefnet, available at 
http://www.beliefnet.com/News/2005/10/How-Porn-Destroys-Lives.aspx (visited Feb. 14, 2012). Massive 
selection bias is at work. 
 This phenomenon has been documented by others. See, e.g., M. Douglas Reed, Pornography 
Addiction and Compulsive Sexual Behavior, in MEDIA, CHILDREN, AND THE FAMILY: SOCIAL 
SCIENTIFIC, PSYCHODYNAMIC, AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 249 (Dolf Zillmann et al. eds., 1994). 
But these anecdotes do not show how common this problem is among users of pornography. This kind 
of solitary obsessiveness is also not unique to pornography. It occurs with many activities that are 
usually harmless. People have even been known to spend too many hours reading philosophical essays 
like this one (although this is a very specialized taste). Difficulties with the concept of “pornography 
addiction” are elaborated in Martin P. Levine & Richard R. Troiden, The Myth of Sexual Compulsivity, 
26 J. SEX RES. 347 (1988). 
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resolved this difficulty by creating a man so strong he could not be hurt, 
who needed no help from her in taking his pleasure. This created a safe 
environment in which she could take her own pleasure. Once she 
understood this, her relationship with her husband improved. Bader thinks 
that many domination fantasies take this form; they often circumvent guilt 
and thus enable desire.
54
 
One of Freud’s key insights is that the overt and latent content of 
fantasies (sexual or otherwise) are often very different from each other. 
Sexual fantasies operate at a quasi-infantile level of consciousness, where 
the superego cannot operate and where moral judgment is misplaced. Jan’s 
fantasy is not really about rape at all: rape is a placeholder for the relief of 
other needs.
55
 Jan has not the slightest interest in actually being raped. 
This separation of overt and latent content is never guaranteed. The 
sexual fantasies of the serial rapist are the clearest example. The 
eroticization of male dominance and female submission has manifestly 
had effects outside the bedroom.
56
 The question of what proportion of 
fantasists actually manage to accomplish the separation is an empirical 
one, not easily answered from the philosopher’s armchair. (It may not be 
answerable at all.) But the problem is made to appear far too easy by 
assuming that overt content tells you everything you need to know. 
What, according to Langton, should Jan do? There seems to be 
something deeply morally suspect about her fantasy. She is using her 
husband as a screen upon which to project her disgusting story. Her 
therapist aims to free her of shame about her fantasies, to avert move [4]. 
But Langton casts doubt on whether her therapist is right to do this. 
Perhaps Jan should be ashamed of her fantasy. It is not only solipsistic 
and a falling away from the ideal, but grotesquely solipsistic since it is 
modeled on an evil scenario. It divides her internally, setting her political 
commitment to eradicate oppression against her eroticization of 
humiliation.
57
 We have already seen that Langton does not think a rape 
fantasy can be mutual, even if both parties enthusiastically participate. 
 
 
 54. MICHAEL J. BADER, AROUSAL: THE SECRET LOGIC OF SEXUAL FANTASIES 51–55 (2002). A 
similar analysis can explain many other fantasies, including those involving urination and defecation, 
exhibitionism and voyeurism, cross-dressing, incest, and multiple partners. Id. at 115–41. 
 55. Thomas Nagel pertinently notes the enormous variety of sexual meanings: “I don’t want to 
see films depicting torture and mutilation, but I take it as obvious that they do something completely 
different for those who are sexually gratified by them; it’s not that they are delighted by the same thing 
that revolts me; it’s something else that I don’t understand, because it does not fit into the particular 
configuration of my sexual imagination.” CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE 50 (2002). 
 56. Sandra Lee Bartky, Feminine Masochism and the Politics of Personal Transformation, in 
FEMININITY AND DOMINATION: STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF OPPRESSION 45–62 (1990). 
 57. Id. at 51–52. 
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Vadas observes that the thrill of sadomasochist scenes depends on the 
existence of the abuses that they simulate; their existence “conceptually 
and empirically requires the existence or occurrence of actual injustice.”58 
“To take pleasure in this simulation is to make one’s pleasure contingent 
on the actual occurrence and meanings of rape, racist enslavement, and so 
on. Pleasures taken in this way are not feminist, and cannot be.”59 
So should Jan tell her husband what she is thinking, or would that just 
make matters worse? If he has sex with her knowing that he is causing 
these images to arise in her head, then is he not participating in the 
construction of a kind of violent pornography, and himself accepting the 
role of a rapist? If he does not want to assume that role, must the couple 
stop having sex? Is Jan’s sexuality irredeemable? Her fate seems to be 
solipsism either way. If she has sex, she is in a fantasy world; if she stops 
having sex, then she is even more cut off from the interpersonal 
communion that Langton wants to promote. Perhaps the answer is 
aversion therapy, of a kind that was once routinely administered to 
homosexuals, designed to repel her from what she once found arousing; 
but unfortunately such therapy has been shown to be better suited to 
killing than to reshaping desire.
60
 
Langton worries that there may be “pornography that celebrates rape, 
that makes its readers think and experience sexually as Leonard thought 
and experienced sexually.”61 But whether there is or is not, such 
pornography is not the only source of fantasies such as Leonard’s. For all 
that we are told in the novel, Leonard, a somewhat repressed young 
English man born around 1930, has never even seen pornography that 
shows nude women posing for the camera, much less the violent 
pornography that concerns Langton. Pornography did not produce 
Leonard’s peculiar sexuality. World War II did that. 
It probably is not possible to purge the world of fantasy. Langton 
acknowledges that fetishes are remarkably easy to conjure: one researcher 
managed to “create . . . a mild boot fetish in heterosexual male students by 
pairing slides of sexually provocative women with a picture of a pair of 
 
 
 58. Melinda Vadas, Reply to Patrick Hopkins, 10 HYPATIA 159, 160 (1995). 
 59. Id. 
 60. I acknowledge that many years’ study of debates over gay rights has left me suspicious of 
anyone’s efforts to reconstruct other people’s harmless sexual proclivities. On the question of whether 
it is wrong to eroticize activities that are themselves wrong, see John Corvino, Naughty Fantasies, 18 
SOUTHWEST PHIL. REV. 213 (2002). Corvino observes that one may eroticize a behavior while 
remaining fully cognizant of its wrongfulness. Id. It must be conceded, however, that the fact that one 
finds a given behavior sexually arousing can be an impediment to perceiving its wrongfulness. 
 61. LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 353. 
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black knee-length women’s boots.”62 It is a fact about human sexuality 
that humans can sometimes be aroused by objects. This, Langton says, is a 
“sorry tale.”63 The world is full of such sorry tales. 
Fantasy has its uses. Leonard’s thoughts of domination are ones “that 
he was powerless to send away when he was making love,”64 but he also 
discovers that, by thinking during coition about the circuit diagrams for 
the tape recorders he modifies at work, he is able to avoid premature 
ejaculation.
65
 Jan’s acceptance of her fantasies apparently helped her 
relationship with her husband. One might imagine an adolescent Jan 
becoming more reconciled to her own peculiar sexuality by exploring 
pornographic fantasies of rape, even ones that include the vicious idea that 
women secretly want to be raped and benefit from it. 
Langton’s intolerance of fantasy may help explain why she has so little 
interest in the specific content of fantasies. There are remarkably few 
descriptions of any actual pornography in Sexual Solipsism. She 
acknowledges the importance of the question, “does pornography even say 
the things that it is claimed by MacKinnon to say? Does it say that women 
are inferior, or that sexual violence is normal and legitimate?”66 
Her response completely misses the point. She claims there are “two 
reasons for doubting that pornography says these things.”67 One is that 
“pornography does not seem to say such things explicitly.”68 The other is 
“that much pornography purports to be fantasy or fiction.”69 She responds 
by showing that fictions can implicitly convey purported facts about the 
world.
70
 However, there is a third reason, no more esoteric than the other 
two, for doubting that a given piece of pornography says these things: it 
may in fact not be saying them. The only way to tell is to examine the 
pornography and see what it is saying. Perhaps Langton’s lack of interest 
in actual content rests on the common assumption that all pornography is 
 
 
 62. Id. at 174 (quoting Edward C. Nelson, Pornography and Sexual Aggression, in THE 
INFLUENCE OF PORNOGRAPHY ON BEHAVIOR (Maurice Yaffé & Edward Nelson eds., 1982) (citing S. 
Rachman, Sexual Fetishism: An Experimental Analogue, 16 PSYCH. RECORD 293 (1966)). Such 
evidence suggests that unusual sexual tastes may be subject to behavioral as well as psychodynamic 
explanation: here arousal was brought about via a simple process of conditioning. Both explanations 
evidently have some truth, and their relative strength is likely to vary from one person to the next. See 
Padmal de Silva, Paraphilias, 6 PSYCHIATRY 130 (2006). 
 63. LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 183. 
 64. McEWAN, supra note 21, at 78. 
 65. Id. at 59. 
 66. LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 177. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 178. 
 70. I agree. See Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, supra note 7, at 1643–47.  
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the same, that low cultural forms are devoid of complexity. That 
assumption cannot survive contact with real pornography.
71
 The variety of 
forms of pornography is multiplied by the enormous variation in meanings 
that different readers assign to it.
72
 The specific content would not matter, 
however, if the problem with pornography is its status as a sexually 
arousing object that is not a person. Perhaps here, too, she is relying on the 
modified Vadas claim. 
If we condemn any sexual attachment that is not attachment to a 
specific person, then we must condemn, not only fetishes, but 
heterosexuality and homosexuality as such. Both of these are tendencies to 
be aroused by certain body types, irrespective of the persons who inhabit 
them, and generally are felt prior to meeting any particular partner.
73
 There 
would also be something problematic about feeling aroused by any person 
to whom you have not been introduced. If you see an attractive stranger—
a person standing near you on the beach, perhaps, or the prettiest girl at the 
party—and are aroused, it is the image, not the autonomous person, which 
is arousing you. The object of your arousal might as well be a photograph. 
It then is not necessarily a person. The modified Vadas claim is applicable 
to you. 
The only acceptable sexuality would be a general, undifferentiated 
loneliness that remains vague until a specific love object is found and 
interviewed so thoroughly as to yield complete transparency, at which 
point cathexis would have to occur straightway and remain focused with 
laser-like precision on that specific person. This is not a sexuality that 
occurs often among human beings. I will bet that it never does. If that is 
the standard that humans must meet, then everyone’s sexuality is 
defective. 
 
 
 71. See LAURA KIPNIS, BOUND AND GAGGED: PORNOGRAPHY AND THE POLITICS OF FANTASY IN 
AMERICA (1999); LINDA WILLIAMS, HARD CORE: POWER, PLEASURE, AND THE “FRENZY OF THE 
VISIBLE” (rev. ed. 1999). I haven’t spent a lot of time reading pornography either, but I can recall one 
example that shows that even the lowest cultural forms can display a shrewd intelligence. When I was 
twelve years old and in summer camp, a pornographic novel circulated among the boys in my cabin. It 
was a cheap product with a tombstone cover, billed as The Wild Nympho by Dick Pleasant. It 
consisted, for the most part, of graphically described sexual episodes. There is, however, a moment of 
real wit. At the denouement of the thin story, the narrator declares that at last he had come to the 
appalling realization “that it was not me she truly loved – but it!” Forty years later it still makes me 
smile. (I rely here on my recollection. The volume has vanished without a trace; there is no reference 
to it anywhere on the World Wide Web.) 
 72. See Feona Attwood, What Do People Do With Porn? Qualitative Research Into the 
Consumption, Use, and Experience of Pornography and Other Sexually Explicit Media, 9 SEXUALITY 
& CULTURE 65 (2005). 
 73. For a similar argument, see JOHN STOLTENBERG, REFUSING TO BE A MAN: ESSAYS ON SEX 
AND JUSTICE 93 (rev. ed. 2000). 
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The Freudian account of sex has at least this much validity: ordinary 
successful love, when it is achieved, is a congeries of heterogeneous 
primitive impulses, including idealization, transference of love for the 
parent, and infantile yearning for the breast, that somehow manage to 
coexist with a sober recognition of the real qualities of the other. The 
result is a delicate balancing of forces in tension: 
Symbiotic feelings of merger, oneness, and bliss are experienced 
but the lovers nevertheless retain their independent self-boundaries, 
except during sexual intercourse. They do not regress to the point 
where self-boundaries become blurred. Self-love is held in check by 
love for the other. Feelings toward earlier love objects have been 
successfully transferred to the new one, but this transfer does not 
include the need to repeat early disappointments and to recapitulate 
past trauma. . . . Idealization, identification, and regression to 
infancy all partake in the love experience without being allowed to 
go beyond a certain limit. Seen in this perspective love constitutes 
an ideal compromise formation of a great variety of wishes and 
needs. What is surprising, therefore, is not that it often falls short of 
the ideal, but that in spite of these numerous checks and balances, 
many lovers succeed in transforming falling in love into an 
approximation of ideal love.
74
 
So perhaps we should be grateful whenever it happens, even if a boot 
fetish, or still nastier things, are part of the mix. Jan’s rape fantasy is 
helping to hold the whole rickety emotional structure together for her.  
There is even value in overtly sadistic fantasies, such as those of 
Leonard and Jan, so long as they understand that those fantasies are, in 
fact, unreal.
75
 And that means that something valuable would be lost if 
those fantasies were deemed too awful to express. One lesson of 
Leonard’s cautionary tale is that you need to talk to your lover about what 
you want. (Leonard’s fundamental mistake would then be [6], which 
prevented the dispelling of delusions [2], [3], and [7].) 
 
 
 74. MARTIN S. BERGMANN, THE ANATOMY OF LOVING: THE STORY OF MAN’S QUEST TO KNOW 
WHAT LOVE IS 277 (1987). 
 75. Bartky takes masochism, which she concedes may be unchangeable, as evidence that some 
people “may have to live with a degree of psychic damage that can never be fully healed.” Bartky, 
supra note 56, at 58. But this evaluation is inconsistent with her acknowledgement that “[t]he 
significance of a particular form of desire as well as its persistence may lie in a developmental history 
only half-remembered or even repressed altogether.” Id. at 61. Absent a full understanding of the 
psychic economy of each and every masochist, it is not possible to know whether, in any particular 
person, this particular fantasy signifies damage or something else. 
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Authentic communication is valuable. But guilt about sexual fantasy 
likely inhibits that goal. Drawing on the work of Christine Korsgaard, 
Langton argues persuasively that a woman in eighteenth century 
Germany—she specifically has in mind Maria von Herbert, who 
corresponded with Kant about the ethics of lying to her fiancé about (as it 
turned out) whether she was a virgin—had no obligation to disclose her 
status as “damaged goods.”76 This is so for the same reason that, 
Korsgaard argues, one has no obligation to tell a murderer who comes to 
the door that his intended victim is present in the house.
77
 Because, in the 
circumstances of the her society, “her action will not be taken as the 
honest self-revelation of a person, but the revelation of her thing-hood, her 
hitherto unrecognized status as used merchandize, as an item with a price 
that is lower than the usual.”78 She may even have a duty to lie, based on 
her own self-respect. 
If Leonard’s strange and unbidden fantasy is taken to mean that he is 
defective and unlovable, a solipsist with whom no relationship is possible, 
then perhaps he, too, “is permitted to have friendship as [his] goal, to be 
sought and preserved, rather than a law to be lived by.”79 Perhaps it is not 
safe to tell Maria what he is thinking. As we have seen, however, that 
produces pathologies of its own. 
Langton does make a small concession to Martha Nussbaum’s claim 
that objectification, the treating of human beings as if they were things, 
can sometimes be “a wonderful part of sexual life.”80 The valuable aspect 
of objectification, Langton thinks, is “phenomenological gilding,” in 
which what is desired appears “as having independent qualities that 
justify, demand, or legitimate the desire, making it almost literally appear 
to have independent value.”81 This can happen in sexual love: “every 
bodily feature appears as precious, every gesture illuminated.”82 But all 
this gilding consists in the assignment of value to a beloved whose 
genuine characteristics are soberly understood. There is no trace of fantasy 
here. 
Nussbaum has a different view. She shares Langton’s worry about 
sexual autarky and is unhappy about pornography’s implication that “an 
 
 
 76.  LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 221–22. 
 77. Christine Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing With Evil, in CREATING THE 
KINGDOM OF ENDS 133 (1996). 
 78. LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 221–22. 
 79. Id. at 222. 
 80. Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification, in SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 214 (1999). 
 81. LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 249. 
 82. Id. at 250. 
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easy satisfaction can be had in this uncomplicated way, without the 
difficulties attendant on recognizing women’s subjectivity and autonomy 
in a more full-blooded way.”83 But Nussbaum thinks that “of course, none 
of these arguments entails moral criticism of masturbation.”84 She 
elaborates in her discussion of James Joyce’s Ulysses in her book 
Upheavals of Thought, reflecting on the “Nausicaa” scene in which 
Leopold Bloom masturbates as Gerty MacDowell leans back and shows 
him her legs and underwear. Their interaction is imperfect, mediated by 
fantasies in both of their minds that barely overlap. But Nussbaum rejects 
the idea that fantasy is an obstacle to sexual happiness, and insists on “the 
omnipresence of fantasy in sexual life.”85 She writes: 
[I]n demanding a perfect authentic sexuality, in which two 
individuals confront the essence of one another’s souls, enclosed by 
no constructed images, the antifantasy reading actually proves an 
accomplice of the very Romantic (and Christian) images it purports 
to repudiate. For who has said that it is so bad, so inauthentic, to be 
aroused by a fantasy that does not fully intersect with the other 
party’s sense of his or her authentic self?86 
The Romantic tradition “repudiates the way real people are.”87 In the 
imperfect communion of Gerty and Bloom, “across the barriers of fantasy 
that divide and also join them, there passes a kind of love and sympathy, 
which one may notice as such (while not sentimentalizing it, while still 
taking note of its unsatisfactory and slightly ridiculous character) if one is 
not looking too hard for something else.”88 
None of this necessarily entails that the law must tolerate the 
dissemination of any kind of sexual fantasy. It may be that some 
pornography must be suppressed in order to prevent sexual violence. I take 
no position on that here.
89
 The issue is not empirical or predictive but 
 
 
 83. Nussbaum, supra note 80, at 235. In this volume, Nussbaum is also suspicious of violent 
sexual fantasy: “the batterer who imitates a violent porn book or video is not misinterpreting (except in 
the sense that the maker of the work plainly aimed at masturbation, not real-life enactment).” Martha 
Nussbaum, Rage and Reason, in SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 248. That is a pretty important “except.”  
 84. Nussbaum, supra note 80, at 428 n.56.  
 85. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 696 
(2001). 
 86. Id. at 696–97. 
 87. Id. at 697. 
 88. Id. 
 89. I have discussed it in Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, supra note 7, at 1663–72. 
Suppression would also have to address free speech concerns, which Langton barely discusses, except 
occasionally to suggest that pornography may not be communicative speech at all. See LANGTON, 
SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 100–02, 174–75, 296–97; Rae Langton, Beyond Belief: 
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ethical: whether it is appropriate to positively value any consumption of 
pornography by anyone, ever. If it is, if there is value in this kind of 
fantasy, then suppressing it will harm people, and perhaps quite a lot of 
people.
90
 Some note should also be taken of the fact that fantasy is 
ineradicable. The idea that it can be snuffed out is another fantasy, one that 
impairs our ability to address real pathologies. 
B. The Sources of Illocutionary Disablement 
Ideals can generate characteristic pathologies. The problem of date rape 
is one of Langton’s central concerns. It is a consequence of misplaced 
ideals, but she does not explore the mechanisms by which this occurs.  
She focuses persistently on illocutionary disablement—the construction 
of a set of linguistic background conditions in which a woman’s saying 
“no” to sex cannot be heard or understood as a “no,” because conventions 
are in place that take “no” to mean “yes.” She elaborates at length and 
with admirable care on the concept of such disablement, clarifies 
ambiguities, and ably defends it against various charges of incoherence.
91
 
She shows that it should be an urgent concern of those who care about 
liberty and equality. In this she has performed a valuable service. But she 
is strangely incurious about the primary causes of illocutionary 
disablement. 
She considers two possible sources. One is men’s coming to feel “that 
violence is sexy and coercion legitimate.”92 Another is the prevalence of 
“rape myths,” such as the notions that women enjoy rape and that rape 
victims deserve their treatment.
93
 The problem is entirely in men’s heads. 
The idea that women sometimes say “no” when they mean “yes” is an 
unreal, narcissistic male fantasy. 
But in fact this social script is commonly accepted by women as well 
as men. About 40% of college-age women self-report that they have in 
 
 
Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography, in SPEECH AND HARM: CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE 
SPEECH 72 (Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds., 2012). For responses to this claim, see 
Andrew Koppelman, Madisonian Pornography, or, The Importance of Jeffrey Sherman, 84 CHICAGO-
KENT L. REV. 597 (2009); Andrew Koppelman, Is Pornography “Speech”?, 14 LEGAL THEORY 71 
(2008); Andrew Koppelman, Free Speech and Pornography: A Response to James Weinstein, 31 
N.Y.U. REV. OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 899 (2007). 
 90. The benefits of pornography for many readers are examined at length in NADINE STROSSEN, 
DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS 141–78 
(1995), although Strossen overstates her case by refusing to acknowledge any countervailing harms. 
 91. LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM, supra note 10, at 25–117, 173–95. 
 92. Id. at 45. 
 93. Id. at 38. 
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fact sometimes said no when they meant yes or maybe.
94
 Even more men 
than women engage in token resistance to sex, and more men than women 
sometimes consent to unwanted sex.
95
  
“Token resistance” is a social script that makes sense within a 
hierarchical conception of gender. That conception lays down ideals of 
behavior for both sexes, and it is the ideals that lead to the illocutionary 
disablement. Women who overtly pursue sex (and men who are not 
sexually aggressive) are objects of contempt. Token resistance makes it 
possible for a woman to obtain the benefit of sex while communicating 
that she does not have an appetite for promiscuous sex. Her partner’s 
virility is affirmed, because, as Dan Kahan puts it, “a woman who has 
demonstrated (appropriate) reluctance to engage in sex generally is 
nonetheless unable to repress her desire to engage in sex with him.”96 
Token resistance may be rational for the women who engage in it. 
They do not want to be stigmatized for taking sexual initiative.
97
 But this 
 
 
 94. See Susan Sprecher, Elaine Hatfield, Anthony Cortese, Elena Potapova & Anna Levitskaya, 
Token Resistance to Sexual Intercourse and Consent to Unwanted Sexual Intercourse: College 
Students’ Dating Experiences in Three Countries, 31 J. SEX RES. 125 (1994), and sources cited 
therein.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in 
“Acquaintance Rape” Cases, 158 U. PENN. L. REV 729, 757 (2010). Kahan’s experimental study of 
perceptions in a controversial acquaintance-rape case finds that the persons most disposed to form pro-
defendant perceptions were hierarchical women, especially older ones. Kahan explains the result thus: 
Within the hierarchical worldview, token resistance to sex is understood as a strategy by 
women who desire casual sex to disguise their lack of virtue relative to women who faithfully 
adhere to hierarchical norms against forming and acting on such desires. Women who are 
strongly committed to a hierarchical worldview, then, are disposed more readily to perceive 
that women are saying “no” while meaning “yes”—and to condemn them for that—because 
women who have succeeded in fulfilling gender-role expectations that attend the role of 
women within a hierarchical way of life are the ones with the greatest identity-protective 
stake in law’s affirmation of hierarchical norms. Thus, far from reflecting a dispute among 
women and men, contestation about the significance of the word “no” . . . features a conflict 
primarily among women on how the indulgence of the desire for sex outside of relationships 
sanctioned by hierarchical norms should affect women’s social status. 
Id. at 794. These older hierarchical women are unlikely to have learned their attitudes from 
pornography. 
 97. This rationality occurs in the context of perceived social norms. One study found that token 
resistance was uncorrelated with traditional gender role attitudes. What mattered was the woman’s 
perception of the attitudes held by the culture and, especially, the perceived attitude of the man she 
was with. Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When They 
Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 872, 878 (1988). This suggests that the pattern of norms may have a prisoner’s 
dilemma aspect, much like the old custom of dueling: its pernicious effects perpetuate themselves 
because of the costs to individuals who attempt to exit the pattern, even though many, perhaps most, 
would prefer that the norm not exist. For a similar analysis of Chinese foot-binding and contemporary 
female genital mutilation, see Gerry Mackie, Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention 
Account, 61 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 999 (1996).  
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rational behavior obviously has destructive effects on other women, who 
may suffer illocutionary disablement of just the kind that Langton focuses 
on. 
Social scripts of this kind can account for some pretty bad male 
behavior. “If a man encounters a woman who says no and he ignores her 
protests and finds that she is indeed willing to engage in sex, his belief that 
women’s refusals are not to be taken seriously will be strengthened.”98 The 
same script may impose severe penalties if he backs off when the refusal is 
not real: he will be stigmatized as unmanly.
99
 (This may help to explain 
why men sometimes consent to unwanted sex.) The path is thus laid down, 
first to illocutionary disablement, and then to rape.
100
 An indispensable 
component of this particular causal pathway is a particular set of ideals—
sexist ideals of appropriate sexual comportment for men and women. 
None of this shows that pornography does not do the harm that 
Langton alleges. It is possible that pornography exacerbates these 
tendencies, and it is even possible that legal suppression of pornography 
will help to ameliorate the problem. But to blame pornography, without 
paying any attention to the social conventions just described, is magical 
thinking. 
If sexual practice is to be reformed, then perhaps something can be 
learned even from the sadomasochistic practices that Langton so disdains. 
Sadomasochist subcultures have developed elaborate rituals of consent, 
tightly constructed defenses against blurring and pseudo-empathy—most 
notably, the use of a “code word” to indicate that things have gone too far 
and should now stop.
101
 Meanwhile, in the mainstream culture of 
heterosexual sex, as many as one female in three is raped or sexually 
assaulted. The most salient difference between SM and the ritual of male 
dominance and female submission that characterizes so much heterosexual 
sex is that in the SM scene, the “submissive” partner is always firmly in 
control of what goes on. Perhaps it would be a good thing if the SM 
subculture became less closeted, and the majority began to internalize that 
group’s norms.  
 
 
 98. Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 97, at 878. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Antonia Abbey, Misperception as an Antecedent of Acquaintance Rape: A Consequence 
of Ambiguity in Communication Between Women and Men, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN 
CRIME 96 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991). 
 101. These are briefly described in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, Jr., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE 
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 260–61 (1999). 
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C. Ought Implies Can 
Sex frequently occasions mistreatment of human beings: physical and 
emotional abuse, manipulation and deception, the reckless spread of 
disease, and the irresponsible begetting of children. Since one should not 
mistreat people, one should not mistreat them sexually. 
Speech, pornographic or otherwise, that encourages its audience to 
engage in such mistreatment is reprehensible. But one must examine each 
instance of speech to determine whether this is so. Broad categories such 
as “pornography” (or, in constitutional law, “obscenity”) are unhelpful for 
this purpose.
102
 
The goodness of sex at its best has to do with its character as a certain 
kind of interpersonal communion. Sex at its best is essentially interaction 
with another person, an interaction in which you love and value me in my 
wholeness, as body and mind and infantile neediness, and I love and value 
you in the same way. When I am the object of lust, this sometimes means 
that I am appreciated in the full embodied particularity of my self, as I am 
not if you only love me for my mind.
103
 Objectification is also a common 
human aspiration. It can take pathological forms, of course. Most people, 
however, want to be the object of someone’s desire.104 
Many people are unable to achieve the full goodness associated with 
sex at its best, often because of the simple bad luck of never meeting a 
suitable partner. What may they hope? When a given sexual act, one that 
involves no mistreatment of another person, is the best that is available for 
this person at this time, it is uncharitable to condemn it. Sex at its best 
demands generosity toward human neediness and imperfection. It is self-
defeating and ungenerous to condemn sex for being imperfect.
105
 The 
stigmatization of masturbation, for example, is stupid and destructive 
precisely because of its brutal attitude toward sexual neediness. 
If the feminism of hope hopes for the wrong things, then the feminism 
of fear will fear the wrong things. Fantasy as such is not the enemy. Even 
in sex at its best, all sorts of thoughts run through our heads that have 
 
 
 102. Pornography is a formulaic genre, of course, but as with all formulaic fiction individual 
examples vary considerably in the ways they conform to the norms of the genre. Compare Mickey 
Spillane’s novel KISS ME DEADLY (1953), which uncritically adores its brutal and sadistic hero, with 
Robert Aldrich’s film adaptation, which views the same activities from a severe critical distance. KISS 
ME DEADLY (Parklane Pictures Inc. 1955). 
 103. This point is developed well in SCRUTON, supra note 48, at 68–83. 
 104. Leslie Green, Pornographies, 8 J. POL. PHIL. 27, 45–46 (2000). 
 105. See Andrew Koppelman, Reading Lolita at Guantanamo, 53 DISSENT 64 (Spring, 2006); 
Andrew Koppelman, Eros, Civilization, and Harry Clor, 31 N.Y.U. REV. OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 
855 (2007). 
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nothing to do with the particularity of the person we are with here and 
now. What goes on is nonetheless properly called making love. The love 
that is made is human love, love of the kind that is suited to the kind of 
beings that we are. A sexual ideal that does not acknowledge that we are 
that kind of being is itself a projective fantasy, a kind of solipsism.  
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